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Opening Remarks
John J. Balles and
Michael W. Keran*
Keran. We would like to welcome you to
the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco's
Economic Series-a lecture series which has
been going on for the past seven and one half
years. The series has been designed to bring
together in one place people from diverse
backgrounds-academia, the business com-
munity and the financial community-with a
common interest in public-policy issues. We
hope that, with this joining of minds, we will
all learn something useful.
Today's seminar is a special one-partly
because we have not one, but two speakers.
The only previous occasion of this type was
four years ago, when we had a debate on the
monetafist controversy by Professor Franco
Modigliani, then President of the American
Economic Association, and Professor Milton
Friedman, who had just been awarded the
Nobel Prize in economics. Recently, on re-
reading the summary of that debate, I found
that it had an interesting and current ring to it.
Basically, the debate concerned whether
monetary policy should be used to stabilize the
business cycle, or used to reduce the inflation
rate. Four years ago, the Carter Administra-
tion clearly chose to use monetary policy to
work on the business cycle. Today, we have
another, new administration, which has
unveiled perhaps some of the most dramatic
and far-reaching economic proposals we've
had since the New Deal. And we're very fortu-
nate to have two distinguished and
knowledgeable speakers to discuss the Admin-
istration's program.
Balles. Michael Keran has given me a very
easy and pleasurable assignment today- the
privilege of introducing our guest speakers. I
join Mike in welcoming our friends from the
business, banking and academic communities.
From my personal standpoint, it's a great relief
to be listening to rather than giving a speech,
*Mr. Balles is and Mr. Keran is Senior Vice
President, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
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since in this way I get my intellectual batteries
recharged from time to time.
Our principal speaker today, as you know, is
Professor James Tobin, Sterling Professor of
Economics at Yale University. Professor
Tobin hardly needs an introduction to a group
like this; still, I'm going to give a few high-
lights. Throughout his long career - his first
published paper appeared 40 years ago this
month in the Quarterly Journal ofEconomics -
Professor Tobin has been interested in the
impact ofpublic policy on the macro economy,
and especially on the twin problems of infla-
tion and unemployment. (That first paper, for
example, concerned the impact of a general
wage change on employment and the price
level.) Over the years he's made distinguished
contributions in economics, always seeking to
maintain a balance between theoretical rigor
and empirical relevance-trying to avoid both
measurement without theory,' and theory
without empirical implications. This concern
with the real world, the political economy in its
broadest sense, has also made him a valued
advisor to presidents and to seekers of the
presidency. And as you well know, he served
20 years ago as amember ofthe President's
Council ofEconomic Advisers. He's been par-
ticularly active in the area of macroeconomics
most relevant to the Federal Reserve-the
structure of financial markets, and the links
between the Fed's policy actions and the real
economy via the banking system. The money-
market models we use today to guide Fed
policy owe a great deal to the pioneering work
ofTobin and generations ofhis students, many
ofwhom have found their way into the Federal
Reserve System. We're fortunate to have him
with us today to discuss the President's eco-
nomic-policy package. Perhaps he'll also have
something to say about the role ofthe Federal
Reserve in dealing with the nation's economic
problems. I'm happy to introduce to you Pro-
fessor James Tobin.The Reagan Economic Plan -
Supply-side, Budget and Inflation
Presentation by James Tobin
It's nice that you have a visitor from the East
every four years, at the beginning ofa new Ad-
ministration. I'd like to assure everybody that
the first art+cle I published, to which President
Balles just referred, was, like many ofmy sub-
sequent ones, an anti-Keynesian paper.
A speaker who casts doubts on President
Reagan's Economic Recovery Program is
likely to be as unwelcome as a ghost at a wed-
ding feast. After viewing the euphoria of the
joint session of Congress when the President
displayed his resilience and his oratorical
magic, I hate to be a wet blanket. I wish that
his was a cause to which I too could rally. I
would like to be enthusiastic about the dawn of
the New Beginning.
There are several ways in which we might
view the Program. We could examine its
micro-economics, how it reorders the nation's
priorities, reallocates the country's resources,
and redistributes income, wealth and power
among individuals, groups, and regions. These
may be the most important issues, the most
fundamental new directions. The Reagan
counter-revolution proposes to shift resources
from public sector to private sector, from civi-
lian government to national defense, from the
Federal government to state and local govern-
ments, from beneficiaries ofsocial programs to
the taxpayers, from the poor and the near-poor
to the affluent and the very rich. These pro-
posals deserve to be considered in detail, item
by item, and evaluated in terms of their eco-
nomic efficiency and equity.
However, the Administration bills and sells
its program primarily as a macro-economic
policy. The President and his spokesmen
appeal for support oftheir counter-revolution-
ary reallocations and redistributions not on
their intrinsic merits, but on the grounds that
they are necessary and sufficient to solve the
problem ofstagflation. Here, we are told, is the
remedy, the only remedy, for high unemploy-
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ment, high inflation, low growth, and lagging
productivity. We are asked to swallow the
micro-economic medicine not because it tastes
good but because it is good for what ails us. So
far, it appears, Congress, press, and public
readily accept the program as the necessary
remedy of our macro-economic ills.
It is the macro aspect of the program that I
propose to discuss, as is only appropriate at a
central bank. I'll begin by reminding you that
there is precious little evidence in interna-
tional experience that successful macro-eco-
nomic management is inversely correlated
with size of government, tax burdens, public
debt, and social transfers. Some countries
whose macro-economic performance we envy
have much larger public sectors, more
generous social welfare programs, greater tax
burdens, and higher budget deficits.
The Reagan recovery program, viewed as
macro policy, has a fiscal side and a monetary
side. Together they are projected to
accomplish the disinflation and the real eco-
nomic growth shown in columns four and five
of my Table 1 and columns one and three of
my Table 2.
A neutral fiscal package
The fiscal policy, viewed from the stand-
point of conventional aggregate demand
analysis, does not seem to be a significant fac-
tor of either stimulus or contraction over the
five years for which it is projected. It is impor-
tant to judge the impact offiscal policy against
what is and has been going on, last year and
this year, and not to use as a hypothetical
reference path President Carter's January
budget. The Carter budget, since it eschewed
tax cuts to offset fiscal drag, would have
tightened fiscal policy dramatically over the
next few years. The Congressional Budget Of-
fice (CBO) compares the Reagan budget pro-
gram with a more realistic baseline, the Carterbudget modified for 1982 and 1983 by some
business tax reductions and by a 10 percent
personal income tax reduction and by
unspecified tax cuts to maintain effective tax
rates constant after 1983. The CBO projections
show little difference between the Reagan
budget and this baseline in macro impacts. If
anything, the Reagan program is a little tighter
than the assumed baseline. Reagan spends less
and taxes and the net effect is close to
neutraL
Actually the high employment budget
deficit (calCulated for, say, 6-percent
unemployment) declines slightly overthe next
few years under the Reagan proposals, even
when the Administration's optimistic inflation
scenario is replaced by the more pessimistic
price forecasts of the CBO and private model-
builders (see Table 3). These are conventional
Keynesian calculations, without supply side
optimism. (Neither do they apply to the
federal government the inflation accounting
we recommend to private businesses, which
would of course tell us that even the actual
budget is already balanced.)
The composition ofthe budget, as well as its
totals and its balance, affects its macro-eco-
nomic impact. Under the Reagan program,
federal purchases of goods and services rise
because ofthe defense build-up. Transfers and
taxes fall. The changes in composition are
but I think they don't change the macro
story just told. For the same budget totals, the
shift to defense purchases is expansionary. On
the other hand, the shift of purchasing power
from liquidity-constrained transferees with
high marginal propensities to consume to
higher income taxpayers is moderately con-
tractionary. Some economists believe that
defense is intrinsically highly inflationary and
cite with foreboding the fact that Reagan's pro-
jected build-up is comparable percentage-wise
to Johnson's Viet Nam spending binge. The
analogy is far from perfect. This defense build-
Table "1
Monetary Growth Targetsvs. Reagan Projectionsof Inflation and
Real Growth Implications for Monetary Velocity
(percent per year, yearly averages)
Year
1980actual
(1 ) + (2) (3) (4) + (5)
Monetary Nominal
(M-18) Velocity GNP Price Real GNP
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'Office of Management and Budget, Fiscal Ycar IY82 Budxe! ReI'isiolls, March 1981, Table 6, p, 13.
Discrepancies between (3) and (4) + (5) are in original sources, and are due to second-order effects
quarterly compounding, and rounding.
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P Q'up starts in an economy with a much larger
amount of slack than there was in January
1966. And it lacks the compulsion to disregard
costs and budget contraints that an actual war
provides.
No observer of the current political scene
can forbear comment on the ironies ofthe po-
litical parties' reversals of roles. Now the Re-
publicans defend planned deficits against
Democratic attack, advocate tax cuts not just
to arrest recession but to sustain incipient
recovery, and resist Democratic proposals to
tilt tax reduction further toward businesses at
the expense of individuals. It was a Demo-
cratic President who deliberately declined,
ever since 1977, to recommend tax cuts to
compensate for fiscal drag and bracket drift,
and who sanctimoniously foreswore counter-
cyclical fiscal measures to overcome the recent
reCeS~1I011.It is the Democrats in Congress who
now issue dire warnings of the inflationary
effects of stimulating the economy by three
years of tax reduction even when the
unemployment rate is 7 1f2 percent and capacity
utilization is barely 80 percent. It is the Repub-
licans - some ofthem, it is true, without full
conviction in their new religion - who say
that it is idle and self-defeating to try to bal-
ance the budget by higher and higher effective
tax rates. The final irony is that it is a Repub-
lican budget, proposed by a President who is a
free enterprise hero, to which the securities
markets are currently registering a vote of no
confidence.
The budget is taking a bad rap from those,
whether liberal Democrats or conservative
investment bankers, who say it is a reckless
gamble to reduce taxes so much. To say this is
not to agree with extravagant Administration
claims that their package increases the national
propensity to save, but only to say that it
doesn't decrease it; clearly the tax cuts by
Table 2
Real Gross National Product and Unemployment, 1980-86
Reagan Scenario compared to Conventional Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reagan
GNP Scenario
GNP (1980 $billion) Unemployment (%) (1980 $billion) GNP Relative
Estimated Conventional to
Reagan Potential at Reagan CBO Estimate for Conventional
Scenario 6% Unempl. Scenario Alternative Reagan Unempl. Estimate
1980 2629 2746 7.2 7.2
1981 2658 2815 7.8 7.8 2663 998
1982 2769 2886 7.2 7.9 2802 988
1983 2908 2958 6.6 7.8 2914 .998
1984 3039 3032 6.4 7.7 3001 1.013
1985 3167 3108 6.0 7.5 3108 1.019
1986 3300 3185 5.6 72 3217 1.026
(I) and (3) Office ofManagement and Budget, Fiscal Year 1982 Budgcr Revisions, March 1981, Table 6, p. 13. GNP
converted to 1980 dollars by deflator projections given in same scenario.
(2) and (5) Author's estimates, assuming (a) Potential GNP grows at 2.5% per year, (b) Y' - Y=Y[.025(U-6.0)]
where Y' is potential GNP (2), U is unemployment percentage (3), .025 is the assumed Okun's Law coefficient,
and the equation is solved to give Y, "actual" GNP (5).
(6) (1)/(5). For 1986, the Reagan scenario gives real GNP 2.6% higher than its unemployment projection would
indicate in a conventional Okun's Law calculation.
(4) Congressional Budget Office estimate ofunemployment conditional on Reagan budget with less optimistic eco-
nomic forecast. CBO, An Ana(vsis 0/ Presidelll Reagan's BudgeT Revisions for Fiscal Year 1982, Staff Working
Paper, March 1981, Summary Table 3, p. xviii.
7themselves, without the expenditure cuts,
would diminish saving relative to GNP. Nor is
it to agree with Lafferite views that the tax cuts
will actually maintain or increase revenues.
That is most improbable, as I shall explain
below.
In judging the fiscal package to be more or
less innocuous in its macro-economic impact, I
am not endorsing it. I have serious
micro-economic and distributional objections,
but I will confine myself here to two
macro-economic reservations. First, I regret
that once again opportunities are being lost to
use tax reduction to gain ground on inflation.
We could cut taxes that directly boost labor
costs and prices, e.g. by reducing payroll
levies. We could go further and offer tax
inducements for disinflationary wage and price
behavior. Second, we could aim for a different
fiscal-monetary mix, one better designed to
foster capital formation and growth. In my opi-
nion, that would involve a tighter budget
Table 3
The Federal Budget, 1980-84
Outlays, Revenues, Deficit, High Employment Deficit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Budget Outlays ($billion)
---
Reagan CBO Estimates Estimates for
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(1), (4), (7) Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis a/President Reagan's Budget Revisions/or Fiscal Year 1982, Staff
Working Paper, March 1981, Summary Table 1, p. xiii.
(2), (8) Reagan estimates plus subtotal for Alternative Programmatic Assumptions, Spending Rates, and Other Factors,
CBO, op, cit., Summary Table 4, p. xxi.
(6) CBO alternative inflation forecast conditional on Reagan program, op. cit, Summary Table 3, p. xviii. Compare
Reagan scenario column (4) ofTable 1.
(3) Column (1) plus Total Reestimates from CBO Summary Table 4, lac. cit., less author's estimate of reduction in out-
lays due to difference between CBO unemployment projections in Summary Table 2 and 6%. In principle, column
(3) differs from (1) by adding outlays due to higher CBO estimates ofinflation and interest rates and by subtracting
outlays, mainly unemployment compensation, due to projected unemployment rates above 6%.
(5) Column (4) multiplied by (1 + l.5(x-1)) where x is the ratio of column (2) Table 2 to column (l) Table 2, i.e.,
potential GNP to projected actual GNP. The elasticity of revenues with respect to GNP is assumed to be 1.5.
(9) = (3) - (5) Negative figures are surpluses.
8policy compensated by a monetary policy that
would give us lower real interest rates.
Monetary policy: disinflation the Fed's job
I turn now to monetary policy, where the
greatest inconsistencies in the Reagan recov-
ery program occur. The President and his Ad-
ministration have assigned the Federal
Reserve responsibility for inflation. You take
care ofprices, they say in effect, and we'll get
the economy moving again. Criticizing imper-
fect marksmanship of the past, the President
and his economic policy-makers order the Fed
to cut the rate ofmonetary growth in halfover
the next five years. This was already the Fed's
policy, as anyone who listens to Paul Volcker
knows. Now he has Beryl Sprinkel and other
monetarists looking over his shoulder, if not
waiting in the wings.
The monetary targets of the Fed and the
Administration are shown in the first column
ofTable I. The idea that money and prices can
be detached and delegated to central bankers
while Congress and the Executive indepen-
dently take care of budget, taxes, employ-
ment, and output is the kind of fallacy that
makes exam questions for freshman econom-
ics, a fallacy now elevated to Presidential
doctrine. If Amtrak hitches engines at both
ends ofa train ofcars in New Haven station -
we still do have a railroad there - one engine
heading west to New York, the other east to
Boston, and advertises that the train is going
simultaneously to both destinations, most
people would be skeptical. Reagan is hitching a
Volcker engine at one end and a Stockman-
Kemp locomotive to the other and telling us
the economic train will carry us to Full
Employment and Disinflation at the same
time.
This inconsistency is shown in Table I. The
third column is the official Administration
projection ofnominal GNP, equal to the totals
ofcolumns four and five, the Reagan scenarios
for inflation and real output growth. Subtract-
ing the monetary targets ofcolumn 1 from the
dollar-GNP projections of column 3 gives the
implied growth rates of velocity of MIB, col-
umn 2. The two numbers correspond to the
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two limits of the MIB target brackets.
There has never been a two-year period over
which the average growth ofMlB velocity has
exceeded 5 percent. It would have to beat that
in each of the next five years, hitting 7, 8,
almost 9 percent to make the Reagan scenario
come true. These increases in velocity are
beyond historical experience, even in the
recent decade of unprecedented financial
innovation. Finance is one sector where
American technology remains the best in the
world, and the possibility of even faster
progress in economizing cash can't be com-
pletely ruled out. But if policy-makers were to
accept rescue from velocity miracles, or a for-
tiori from further regulatory changes, they
would be substituting shadow for substance,
appearance for reality. Although the Fed might
be tempted by any escape route from the cre-
dibility impasse they have painted themselves
into, I assume the Fed really means to do
literally no more than what their taFgets say,
and to do less if the spirit of the policy so dic-
tates.
This translates, whether the Administration
realizes it or not, into significantly lower rates
ofgrowth ofdollar spending on GNP than the
official projections (column three). Ofcourse,
another way to achieve high velocity growth is
to engineer even higher nominal and real
interest rates than those we're now suffering.
But they would surely be inconsistent with the
substantial recovery of real and nominal GNP
promised by the President (columns three and
five). On the other hand, if the inflation and
interest rate projections of the Administration
were realized, velocity would slow down.
Missing: a strategy for disinflation
As devastating as this inconsistency is to the
credibility of the President's program, the
scenario contains a more fatal flaw. This is the
division of nominal GNP, column 3, between
inflation, column 4, and real output growth,
column 5. It defies historical experience to
expect price inflation to subside as rapidly as
shown in column 4 while output recovers as
vigorously as projected in column 5.
Experience tells us the combination is a mostunlikely one, given the stubborn inertia of
existing patterns of inflation. Experience tells
us that disinflation requires recessions,
prolonged slack, and high unemployment.
What entitles this Administration to expect to
cut inflation in half while output is growing
faster than its sustainable potential for five
years?
The only answer that has trickied out of
Washington is an appeal to self-fulfilling
expectations. The public will read column 5.
Observing the decisive budgetary moves ofthe
new Administration, believing them to be the
proper medicine for inflation as advertised, the
public will act to make the predictions come
true. That means they will negotiate lower
wage bargains and slow down price increases.
Previous optimistic inflation forecasts from
the White House have not been self-fulfilling
or otherwise fulfilled, but maybe this time will
be different.
This is an expectations argument, but cer-
tainly not a rational expectations theory.
Rational expectations require a model that
makes sense, one that truly connects policy
actions to results. Rational expectations not
only generate but are generated from such a
model. In this case no such model exists, and
Robert Lucas and Robert Hall are as unlikely
as Lane Kirkland and Sam Church to believe
and act upon the advertised disinflation.
The two major English-speaking democra-
cies are in conservative economic hands, but
the policies and public stance of Margaret
Thatcher in Great Britain are very different
from those of Ronald Reagan in the United
States. Their Prime Minister threatens
workers, managers, and plain citizens like an
authoritarian schoolmaster disciplining an
unruly class. You won't have jobs, profits or
prosperity until you stop inflating your wages
and prices. Our President promises disinflation
without tears, indeed with prosperity. He
encourages unions and managements to carry
on business as usual. After all, inflation is only
the government's fault, and all we citizens are
asked to do is to accept tax goodies and stop
indulging the poor. The Federal Reserve, it is
true, has been following a Thatcher-like policy
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but in whispers. I am one ofthe thousand or so
Americans who hear and read Paul Volcker
and know that MIB is not an army rifle. I pay
attention to Henry Wallich too. I believe they
will do what they say they wili do, and I am
duly scared. If I were Lane I would
take the monetary threats seriouslyand tell my
constituent unions to take it easy.
The Fed's muted threat is quite different
from Her Majesty's First standing
up in Parliament and throughout her country
to say that she doesn't care how much
unemployment there is for how long, or what
is the real rate of growth or decline; she will
stick it through whatever the pain, however
long it takes to eliminate inflation. Reagan has
said nothing like that, and Volcker isn't well
known in Peoria or Spokane, in the shops and
offices where wages and prices are made.
Federal Reserve threats are heard in financial
circles all right, but the bond market does not
seem to be impressed. In summary, if the
Reagan anti-inflation strategy depends on
expectations, the Administration has done and
said nothing to make expectations work in its
favor.
Let there be no illusion. There is no way to
reduce inflation in this country so long as wage
increases proceed at 10 percent a year. There is
no possible miracle of productivity that can
validate such a trend in money wages. Our lost
2 percent per year productivity trend may reap-
pear as mysteriously as it vanished. If we are
very, very lucky, policy to speed investment
and research and development might add
another halfpoint or full point, not this year or
next but some years down the road. But with
the best ofgood fortune we would be left with
domestic core inflation of 7-8 percent unless
the money wage pattern is broken - and it
may be more difficult to break it when workers
can claim to have earned more via improved
productivity. We must also expect an adverse
trend in the terms oftrade between American
labor and resource-based commodities
imported from abroad or produced within the
country. This may be equivalent on average to
a half point or full point of decline in worker
productivity.I emphasize the persistent inertial trend of
money wages in the central non-agricultural
"fixprice" sector ofour economy, because no
lasting solution of our inflation is possible
unless it is brought much closer to the sus-
tainable trend of productivity. In short runs,
especially month to month and quarter to
quarter, popular price indexes can vary widely
around this core inflation rate~ from the weight
offlexible prices loosely tied to U.S. wages. In
the next eighteen months, for example, the
volatile elements in the Consumer Price Index
might be favorable, and the Administration
might be able to point to some apparent suc-
cesses in its battle against inflation. If
mortgage interest rates stay put or fall, the
housing component will contribute less to CPI
inflation news than in 1979-80. Perhaps we
have purchased a respite on the oil front by
selling Awacs to Saudi Arabia, as well as by
slowing down our economy and swallowing the
decontrol of domestic oil prices in one gulp
early this year. Our tight monetary policy, ifit
does nothing else, is appreciating the dollar
against other currencies; this may be bad for
the U.S. export-import position but it lowers
dollar prices ofsome imports and world-traded
commodities. Food price prospects, always
uncertain, are not so favorable, given the end
ofthe grain embargo and the low level ofworld
stocks. My purpose is not to predict prices but
to warn that transient luck in the volatile ele-
ments of price indexes does not signify final
victory, any more than transient misfortune
justified panic about runaway inflation
acceleration in 1979-80.
At the beginning of my talk, I pointed out
that countries with enviable inflation records
in recent years are not invariably those with
Reagan-like fiscal policies. If the successful
countries have a common characteristic, it is
that they have some kind of handle on money
wage decisions.
Here in the United States whoever was the
victor in the November 1980 election had, I
thought, the rare opportunity to use the win-
dow of good feeling that Americans open at
the start of a new Presidential term to gain
control over our wage-price spiral. To engineer
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disinflation without a protracted dose ofreces-
sion and economic stagnation, I believe it is
necessary to give everybody assurance that
everybody else is going to disinflate. Otherwise
the fear and suspicion ofeach group that it will
lose real and relative income lead it to stick to
the existing inflationary pattern. This makes
tough going for a Thatcher policy, and even
tougher going for a contractionary policy with-
out a clear and credible threat.
For this reason, I have favored a pre-
announced schedule of gradually declining
standards for wage increases over a five-year
transitional period. Inducements to obey the
guideposts would be provided by payroll tax
rebates for employees in complying firms, and
for employers too if their percentage markups
do not rise. The guidepost schedule would be
consistent with a macro-economic disinflation-
ary policy to which the Administration, Con-
gress, and Federal Reserve would be solemnly
and visibly committed. Since nominal GNP
growth and wage-cost inflation would decline
in concert, there would be neither suppressed
demand-pull inflation nor the damage to real
economic performance caused by cutting
monetary demand growth while money cost
inflation proceeds unabated.
Such a policy clearly requires a consensus
among labor, business, and government, and
such a consensus clearly requires strong and
persuasive leadership by a popular President.
We lost that opportunity this year, just as we
lost the chance to follow a "cold turkey"
policy with some chance that inflation would
melt faster than previous statistical evidence
leads us to believe it will.
Supply-side economics: no free lunch
But can't we take hope from the recent dis-
covery that the economy has a supply side?
This remarkable revelation plays a big role in
the rhetoric that rationalizes the Reagan pro-
gram, although, as I argued above, the fiscal
program as macro strategy does not really de-
pend on Laffer-Kemp calculus. The official
macro-economic scenario does contain a small
bit ofsupply-side magic. Real GNP five years
out is somewhat larger, relative to the pro-jected unemployment rates, than received
"Okun's law" wisdom would allow. (Table 3,
column 6) There appears to be on average an
extra half percent per year of real growth,
beyond what would normally accompany the
unemployment reductions shown. It is not
clear from what source these gains are sup-
posed to come.
From labor supply? Supply-side wisdom is
that the upward drift of marginal personal tax
rates is drying up the supply of productive
labor. That there has been such a drift, particu-
larly since is undeniable, though it is not
as great as often alleged. The Brookings
Institution tax file permits calculation of the
federal marginal rate of personal income tax,
averaged over all brackets, faced by a bread-
winner with spouse and two children: 1960,
18.8 percent; 1965, 15.9 percent; 1970, 18.2
percent; 1975, 18.0 percent; 1980, 21.6 per-
cent. Yet it is hard to find evidence of a
weakened propensity to supply labor in recent
experience. Labor force participation, over-
time hours of work, multiple job holding,
weekly hours ofwork corrected for changes in
industry mix - none ofthese indicators seem
out ofline with trends and cyclical effects dat-
ing from the 1950s and 1960s. Believe it or
not, most of our seven million unemployed
fellow citizens really do want work, and there
are many "not in labor force" who do also.
Finally, I observe that although the Adminis-
tration's tax bill reduces marginal rates for tax-
payers, especially those in high brackets, its
budget cuts will seriously impair work incen-
tives for low-income families and individuals
dependent on welfare, food stamps, and other
transfers.
In the beliefthat a Curve deserves a Theory,
I have derived rigorously a Laffer Curve based
on labor supply response to after-tax real
wages. Indeed, I have derived two Laffer
Curves, one for Tax Revenues and one for
National Saving (more precisely for Tax
Revenues plus Private Saving, which exceeds
National Saving by the amount of Govern-
ment Purchases, assumed constant.) These
are pictured in Figure 1, which also contains a
rather cryptic, but I hope sufficient, explana-
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tion of their derivation. The important
parameters are the Cobb-Douglas elasticity of
output with respect to capital, a, and with
respect to labor, I-a, and the elasticity oflabor
supply l/f3. In the numerical example, I took
both a and 1/f3 to be 1/3. That is a generous
estimate oflabor supply response; the consen-
sus guess is no higher than 1/6. With these
values my LatTer Curve peaks at a wage tax
rate of 5/6. The National Saving Curve
involves also the marginal propensity to con-
sume, which I took in the exercise to be .4 for
capital income and .8 for after-tax labor
income. The peak of this second, and more
economically significant, Laffer Curve is at a
tax rate of 3/4. I doubt that we are on the
wrong slope ofeither Laffer Curve now, and I
hope we don't go there.
A more credible supply-oriented policy is to
stimulate non-residential fixed investment, in
the hope that accelerating the growth ofcapital
relative to output and labor supply will raise
productivity. As one ofthe Kennedy team that
originated the Investment Tax Credit in 1962,
I have some sympathy with this goal. Clearly I
do not have time to discuss adequately the
Reagan Administration's investment stimuli,
so I will confine myself to four short remarks.
First, as I stated earlier, I regret that we can-
not adopt a mix of macro-economic policies,
fiscal and monetary, that would shift the com-
position of output toward capital formation.
Why can't we? The main reason is simply the
monetarist dogma embraced by the Adminis-
tration, to which the Federal Reserve is
hostage. This locks us into a particular path of
a particular monetary aggregate, invariant to
fiscal policy and other macro-economic cir-
cumstances.
Second, there are ways to provide invest-
ment incentives in the taxation of business
that do not make a shambles of economic effi-
ciency and tax equity, as the present proposals
for accelerated depreciation do. Ifthe intention
is to make amends for the overstatement of
taxable profits due to historical cost deprecia-
tion, there are straightforward ways ofdoing so
without freezing into the tax code a deprecia-
tion system that will still be there if and wheninflation abates. Anyway, this investment dis-
incentive is offset, partially or fully, by another
inflation distortion in the tax code, the deduc-
tibility of nominal interest.
Third, whatever investment incentive is
enacted now should be effective immediately.
Its impact is diluted by a gradual phase-in such
as the Administration proposes, because this
gives an inducement to delay investment pro-
jects.
Fourth, plant and equipment is not the only
social capital. If we wish as a society to make
better provision for the future, we should also
be concerned with the preservation and
improvement of human capital, natural
resources, and public sector facilities and
infrastructure, all ofwhich are sacrificed in the
Reagan budget, pervaded as it is by the
ideology that only private business capital is
productive.
The outlook, I am afraid, is for continued
stagflation, with disappointing results on all
fronts - inflation, unemployment, real out-
put, interest rates, and capital formation. We
will unwind the Great Society, redistribute
income regressively, withdraw the Federal
commitment to the environment, and we will
have little or no macro-economic progress to
show. The Program will not fulfill the promises
that have led the country to support it. I wish I
knew what will happen when the Administra-
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